Race for second place? Explaining East-West differences in anti-muslim sentiment in Germany by Kalter, Frank & Foroutan, Naika
Race for Second Place? Explaining
East-West Differences in Anti-Muslim
Sentiment in Germany
Frank Kalter1,2* and Naika Foroutan2,3
1Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES), University of Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany, 2German Center for
Integration and Migration Research (DeZIM), Berlin, Germany, 3Berlin Institute for Integration and Migration Research (BIM),
Humboldt University of Berlin, Berlin, Germany
It has been shown that anti-Muslim sentiment is more pronounced in East Germany than in
West Germany. In this paper, we discuss existing explanations and add to them.We argue
that some East Germans see themselves as a disadvantaged group in competition with
other minorities, such asMuslims, for social recognition byWest Germans; they are in what
we call a “race for second place”. Based on social identity theory, we expect that this might
be particularly true for those who explicitly self-identify as East Germans. The theoretical
discussion carves out the role of “perceived non-recognition” and “outgroup mobility
threat” as important concepts within the conflicts of belonging. We use unique data from
the survey “Postmigrant Societies: East-Migrant Analogies” for a comprehensive empirical
analysis. We find that factors related to pre-existing arguments – such as socioeconomic
and demographic variables, personality traits, or contact – can capture much of the group
differences in anti-Muslim sentiment, but that they do not fully apply to those who were
born and still live in the East and who explicitly self-identify as East Germans. For this
subgroup, perceived non-recognition adds to the empirical models and outgroup mobility
threat has a stronger effect.
Keywords: East-Germany, ethnic rivalry, identification, islamophobia, outgroup mobility threat, recognition, social
identity theory
INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
Right-wing populism has become a political force in almost every European country, and Germany is
no exception. The rise of the so-called “Alternative für Deutschland” (AfD) over the last decade is one
of the most obvious indicators. The party is now1 represented in the European Parliament, the
German Bundestag and in all 16 state parliaments. So, while there is no doubt that it is a nationwide
phenomenon, there is also no doubt that the party’s success is particularly strong in the eastern part
of Germany. In all five federal states that comprise the former territory of the GDR (except East
Berlin), the AfD received a share of more than 20% in the last state elections, with Saxony leading the
way with 27.5% (2019). In contrast, in the western federal states the maximum share is 13.1% (2018)
in Hesse, while in the other states the figures are more moderate, going as low as 5.3% (2020) in
Hamburg (Der Bundeswahleiter, 2021).
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It is well known that populist nationalism and right-wing
populism are essentially driven by aversion to racial, ethnic,
religious, and sexual minorities, with immigrants and Muslims
being a particularly important target (Rydgren, 2008; Golec de
Zavala et al., 2017). This has also been shown to be true for AfD
voting in Germany (Lengfeld and Dilger, 2018; Pickel and
Yendell, 2018; Rippl and Seipel, 2018). Research has also
shown that anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim attitudes are
particularly strong in eastern Germany (Alba and Johnson,
2000; Zick and Küpper, 2016). Since 9/11 at the latest,
antipathy, hatred and violence in Western democracies have
focused strongly on Muslims, which prompts us to specifically
address anti-Muslim sentiment (AMS) in this paper. They
culminate not least in the rise of Pegida, the so-called
“Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident”,
founded in Dresden in 2014. With the immigration of almost two
million refugees to Germany in 2015 - mainly from Muslim
countries such as Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran - it has gained
even more support. Although it must, again, be emphasized that
anti-Muslim sentiment is by no means limited to eastern
Germany, it is much more pronounced there (Zick et al.,
2019: 86; Pickel and Yendell, 2018).
East-West differences in populist attitudes and behavior have
received much attention in research (Kalmar, 2020; Weisskircher,
2020). Different arguments have been put forward to explain the
high popularity of right-wing populism, which is associated not
only with anti-immigration, but also with anti-elitist, anti-
European, or anti-Western sentiment (Mudde, 2013). Its boom
in the East is likely to be based on a variety of causes. These range
from differences in demographic and socioeconomic
composition to various contextual factors, such as economic
prosperity or the proportion of ethnic minorities. An
important explanatory approach also relates to the specific
experiences in the GDR and the collateral damage of the
transformation and reunification process (Lewicki, 2018;
Küpper et al., 2019), which lead to specific psychological,
political, social, and cultural dispositions and general attitudes.
Empirical studies examining various indicators of right-wing
populism can usually show that these arguments, taken as a
whole, explain a large part of the differences between East and
West, but usually cannot fully account for them.
Surprisingly, systematic accounts of how well these
explanations work when looking at the specific manifestation
of anti-Muslim sentiment are lacking so far. A first goal and
contribution of this paper is therefore a comprehensive empirical
test of whether and to what extent the available arguments, which
we briefly summarize in the first subsection of the theoretical part,
can also contribute to explaining East-West differences in anti-
Muslim sentiment.
A second goal is to complement these explanations by
developing and testing a particular strand of argumentation:
Although it may sound paradoxical, it is argued that East
Germans share some key experiences that are analogous to
those commonly experienced by immigrants (Foroutan et al.,
2019; Foroutan and Hensel, 2020). For example, East Germans
continue to face economic disadvantage, underrepresentation in
top positions, and prejudice. Drawing on social identity theory
(Tajfel and Turner, 1979) and theories of recognition (Taylor,
1992; Lamont, 2018), we argue that anti-Muslim sentiment in
East Germany can also be seen in part as a reaction to recognition
gaps and can be understood as a form of “ethnic” rivalry between
two minorities. East Germans compete with immigrants and
Muslims when it comes to issues of representation and
recognition. Pointedly, one could say that there is a kind of
“race for second place”.
Within this line of reasoning, explicit self-identification,
perceived non-recognition, and outgroup mobility threat
become crucial concepts. In the second part of the analyses,
therefore, we seek to examine whether there is evidence to
support some hypotheses related to the role of these concepts
in explaining anti-Muslim sentiment.
For the empirical analyses, we draw on recently collected data
from the study “Postmigrant societies: east-migrant analogies”
(Foroutan et al., 2020). It offers some unique features that make it
particularly valuable for the purposes of this paper: it is based on a
relatively large sample size with an oversampling of respondents
in the eastern part of Germany. It allows East Germans to be
identified not only by place of residence but also by place of birth
and self-identification; this helps to disentangle some of the
existing explanations. The data contain a rich repertoire of
attitudinal items to capture key concepts. A specific detail of
the design is that some experimental splits were implemented by
randomly asking the same set of questions with respect to
Muslims or with respect to East Germans, and sometimes with
respect to West Germans.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND, STATE OF
RESEARCH, AND EXPECTATIONS
Major Frameworks and Canonical
Explanations
The study of anti-Muslim attitudes in European countries,
sometimes under the label of “Islamophobia”, has received
increasing attention in recent years. The theoretical starting
points largely overlap with research on anti-immigrant or
racist attitudes in general (Strabac and Listhaug, 2008;
Savelkoul et al., 2011; Helbling, 2014). Three broader
frameworks are particularly influential. First, there are theories
of ethnic competition or ethnic threat. These are based on the
fundamental idea that the presence of an outgroup can lead to
competition for scarce resources and thus be experienced as
threatening by the ingroup, leading to negative attitudes
toward the outgroup. The classic references here are the work
of Sherif and Sherif (1969), Blalock (1967), or Blumer (1958). The
core ideas have been further elaborated in different variants.
Threat can be perceived objectively or only subjectively; it can be
realistic or symbolic. Integrated threat theory (Stephan and
Stephan, 1996; Stephan and Stephan, 2000) has been proposed
as an umbrella for the influence of different forms of threat.
The second strand of argument relates to theories of
intergroup contact, most famously Allport (1954) classic
contact hypotheses. It stimulated an entire subfield of research
on the more detailed conditions under which intergroup contact
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reduces negative attitudes (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006; Hewstone
and Swart, 2011).
A third traditional line of theory sees the source of negative
attitudes toward certain groups in more generalized personality
traits, most notably the established concept of authoritarian
personality (Adorno et al., 1950) or related generalized
attitudes, such as social dominance orientation (Asbrock et al.,
2010) or a general fear of pluralism. In a comparative analysis
using data from the 2014 European Social Survey, Pickel and
Öztürk (2019) show that both realistic and symbolic threat and
contact are important predictors of support for a Muslim ban in
Germany as well as in the other European countries.
Authoritarianism has also been shown to be a strong correlate
of anti-Muslim attitudes in Germany (Pickel and Yendell, 2018:
228; Rees and Lamberty, 2019: 198).
While the descriptive fact of a general East-West difference in
anti-Muslim attitudes is a stable empirical finding in diverse
datasets with different indicators (Zick et al., 2019: 86; Pickel and
Yendell, 2018: 226), systematic, straightforward analyses of the
extent to which these explanations already explain these
differences have been lacking. However, there are some
findings pertaining to closely related concepts: Schmidt et al.
(2019) look at attitudes toward foreigners and find that even
when controlling for authoritarianism, contacts, perceived threat,
and other control variables, there is still a significant East-West
difference. Lengfeld and Dilger (2018) analyze the AfD vote and
report a significant effect of living in East-Germany when
controlling for subjective economic deprivation, satisfaction
with democracy, and attitudes toward refugees. Küpper et al.
(2019) focus explicitly on explaining East-West differences in
right-wing populist attitudes; they summarize that several
bundles of factors contribute but cannot fully explain them.
These and other studies have compiled and partially
confirmed a list of explanations for the peculiarities in the
East that can potentially be linked to the general theoretical
frameworks and thus be used to explain the specific case of
anti-Muslim sentiment: First, the sociodemographic composition
of eastern Germany is somewhat different from that of western
Germany. People who moved from the East to the West in the
wake of reunification and its aftermath were relatively young,
more educated, and overrepresented as female (Hunt 2006;
Kröhnert and Vollmer, 2012) - all three factors are known to
be negatively correlated with anti-immigrant attitudes. Second,
the most obvious compositional effect is that the proportion of
people with direct or indirect migration experience is significantly
lower on average in eastern Germany: In particular, relatively few
Muslims live in the eastern states (Pfündel et al., 2021: 52). This
composition effect translates into a context effect, where the
contact theories mentioned above take hold. Third, there is a
gradient in the overall economic situation that is, despite a general
trend of convergence, still visible in differences in incomes,
poverty risks and other indicators (Krause, 2019). Relative
economic deprivation could foster hostile attitudes according
to threat mechanisms.
Another strand of argumentation relates to the socialist past
and the long-term effects of specific socialization processes. This
includes the widespread narrative that there would be no such
thing as racism or anti-Semitism in the communist East - which,
consequently, did not allow for a deeper examination of issues of
racist attitudes (Küpper et al., 2019). Furthermore, communist
socialization did not emphasize minority rights as an essential
part of democratic values. Another important factor could be
religiosity: The GDR was explicitly an atheist state and individual
religiosity is still rather low in the East. However, theoretical
expectations about the influence of religiosity on attitudes toward
Muslims are ambiguous: while one might expect people who are
religious to be more tolerant of outgroups and other religions,
religiosity tends to correlate with traditional values associated
with anti-immigrant attitudes (Helbling, 2014: 245). Empirical
evidence on the role of religiosity on anti-Muslim attitudes is
mixed (Helbling, 2014; Pickel and Yendell, 2018; Pickel and
Öztürk, 2018).
Recognition, Identification, and the
Conflicts of Belonging
For a better understanding of the specifics of anti-Muslim
sentiment among East Germans, it is useful to consider the
fact that some of their experiences are similar to those of
immigrants or ethnic minorities. Although living standards
have certainly converged, the differences in wealth between
West and East Germany have not completely disappeared;
more than 30 years after reunification notable inequalities still
exist (Krause, 2019). Moreover, East Germans continue to be
poorly represented in elite social positions (Vogel and Zajak,
2020). There are still significant sensibility deficits for these
empirical disparities on the part of the West and prejudices
against the so-called “Ossis” (Easterners) persist (Foroutan
et al., 2019). All of this leads to a persistent sense of non-
recognition, which has been empirically demonstrated. For
example, when asked, East Germans often responded that they
feel like “second-class” citizens (Pollack, 2004). Likewise,
perceptions have been articulated in recent years of feeling like
“the others” (Foroutan and Hensel, 2020), strangers, or even
explicitly like “immigrants” in Germany (Kubiak, 2019). At the
same time, there is a growing recognition that immigrant groups,
while facing similar challenges and hurdles, are increasingly
experiencing success and advancement (Kalter et al., 2018;
Foroutan et al., 2019). The fact that a book about eastern
Germany entitled “Integrate us first” by Petra Köpping (2018),
Minister of State in Saxony, made it onto the bestseller lists is a
telling indication of the prevalence of this sentiment.
Thus, there is some awareness of a kind of competition between
different minorities. Accordingly, existing explanations for stronger
anti-Muslim sentiment in East Germany can be supplemented by
approaching the research field not (only) through the lens of racism
or majority vs. minority conflicts - reading East Germans as a
majority and Muslims as a minority - but (also) through the lens of
ethnic hierarchies and ethnic competition between minorities.
Muslims, though also facing anti-Muslim resentment in the
West, are a large part of the “established” West German
population and were already there when East Germans “came in”
in 1990. By looking at the ambivalences of belonging we try to
understand the competitive part of East German Islamophobia as a
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contest for belonging and recognition. Thus, one way for East
Germans to strengthen their self-esteem vis-à-vis the dominant
West is to downgrade another comparison group and thus gain a
more positive self-image.
These ideas relate to theories of recognition such as those
proposed by Honneth (1996), Lamont (2018) or Taylor (1992).
De Guissmé and Licata (2017) explicitly draw on them to argue
that negative intergroup attitudes of minorities against each other
may be due to competition for recognition which goes beyond the
existing structural disadvantages. They emphasize that feelings of
non-recognition are collective in nature and related to a
membership in a group, and can exist even when non-
recognition is not experienced individually. This is consistent
with social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979), according to
which individuals belong to social groups and strive for a positive
self-image for themselves and their social group. Comparison of
the ingroup with (an) outgroup(s) is central to this process.
However, if the comparison is unfavorable, as it might be in
the case of East Germans comparing themselves to West
Germans, this is harmful and there are different strategies to
deal with this negative affect (“positive distinction strategies”).
One of them is “individual mobility”, i.e., individuals disidentify
with their stigmatized ingroup and pursue individual goals which
help them to assimilate to the dominant outgroup. In our case,
disassociation with the ingroup would be one of the strategies for
East Germans to escape their stigmatization and non-recognition
in the face of disadvantage. The opposite would be “explicit self-
identification (ESI)” and it is worth considering this as a key
concept to analyze reactions toward negative primings.
Alternative strategies according to Tajfel and Turner (1979) are
summarized as “social competition” and “social creativity”. Among
the latter, one sub-option is “changing the outgroup”, i.e., the
choice of a different group to be compared with.2 In our case, this
would mean that instead of comparing the ingroup with the
superior outgroup (the West), reference is made to another,
apparently inferior, outgroup, the Muslims. By downgrading,
stereotyping, and othering the Muslim outgroup, self-esteem
and self-perception can grow (Campbell, 1967; Spivak and
Harasym, 2014). But for this othering to remain consistent, the
chosen outgroup, in our case the Muslims, must remain inferior.
Specifically, the potential social mobility of this targeted outgroup
poses a serious threat to the healed social identity. We refer to this
as “outgroup mobility threat” (OMT). As a specification of ethnic
threat, the concept is directly related to the threat theories
mentioned above, particularly Blumer (1958) model of relative
group position. While OMT can also occur on the side of the
dominant majority group, it can serve as an additional sub-
mechanism of social creativity for rival non-dominant groups to
take action against the endangered social identity.
Research Aims and Hypotheses
A first goal of the empirical analyses is to examine the extent to
which factors related to the theoretical framework and existing
empirical findings outlined above can account for the
differences in anti-Muslim sentiment (AMS) between West
and East in Germany. Roughly speaking, the theoretical and
empirical review leads us to assume that a variety of factors
contribute to this difference, including demographic, socio-
economic, personality traits, and contact. As our focus is not
on the already existing arguments, we treat this as a basically
descriptive question and analysis, and we simply report how
important the relevant variables appear in explaining the
variance in AMS. Following our main theoretical
arguments, our interest will rather be focused on the
mechanisms surrounding the conflicts of belonging.
According to the assumptions above, our general
expectation is that – however well the canonical factors can
already account for East-West differences – they will not be
sufficient to explain the specific AMS of those who self-identify
as East Germans.
Hypothesis 1: There will be relatively higher levels of anti-
Muslim sentiments (AMS) among those in the East who explicitly
self-identify (ESI) as East Germans and this difference cannot be
fully explained by factors relating to pre-existing explanations
(“usual suspects” being demographics, socio-economics,
personality traits, and contact).
Following the theoretical arguments (see Recognition,
Identification, and the Conflicts of Belonging) we further expect
that de-identifying with the non-recognized ingroup is one
possible approach to deal with the threat to social identity.
Those who do not choose this coping mechanism have to
resort to alternative strategies, among them “changing the
outgroup”. We therefore hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 2: Perceived non-recognition (PNR) is associated
with greater anti-Muslim sentiment (AMS) among East-born
respondents who explicitly self-identify (ESI) as East-Germans,
controlling for other factors.
As OMT is a specific form of ethnic threat, we expect that:
Hypothesis 3a: Outgroupmobility threat (OMT) is associated with
greater anti-Muslim sentiment (AMS), controlling for other factors.
However, OMT is especially threatening to those who are
marginalized themselves and who rely on a favorable comparison
to escape negative social identity. Accordingly, we expect that:
Hypothesis 3b: The relation between outgroup mobility threat
(OMT) and anti-Muslim sentiment (AMS), controlling for other
factors, is stronger for those East-Germans who explicitly self-
identify (ESI) as East-Germans as compared to all other groups.
DATA AND METHODS
The data for our analyses come from the survey “Postmigrant
Societies: East-Migrant Analogies” (Foroutan et al., 2020). We
refer to them in the following as the “East-Mig” data for short.
They consist of 7,232 telephone interviews conducted in
Germany from July 2018 to January 2019 with respondents
aged 14 and older.3 Sampling was based on a dual-frame
2The other two sub-options are “setting new dimensions” and “changing the
values”. 3For a detailed technical report see Schrenker et al. (2020).
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design (landline and cell phone) (Gabler and Häder, 2009).
Residents of eastern Germany, i.e., the federal states and the
part of Berlin representing the territory of the former GDR, were
oversampled. The dataset includes redressment weights that
account for oversampling and selective nonresponse.
Interviews were conducted in German. For the purposes of
this study, respondents who were born abroad were excluded,
reducing the unweighted sample size to n  6,625.
Similar to the definition of migrant groups, the data allow us
to define affiliation withWest or East Germany in three general
ways: by current place of residence, by place of birth, and by
explicit self-identification (ESI). In our analyses, we classify
respondents into a typology of five categories: 1. West-born in
the West (n  3,739) are respondents who were born in one of
the western (old) states or West Berlin and who also currently
live in the likewise defined western part of Germany.
Accordingly, we distinguish 2. East-born in the West (n 
440) and 3. West-born in the East (n  374). Among those born
in the East, we further distinguish between those who 4. do not
explicitly identify as East Germans (n  1,308) and 5. those
who do (n  741). This is measured by the question “Do you
feel more German or more East German?” and respondents
were classified as explicitly identifying if they answered “more
East German”.4
The central dependent variable, Anti-Muslim sentiment
(AMS), is measured for all respondents with the following
four items: “It should be forbidden for female Muslim
students to wear a headscarf in school”5, “I would not
mind a Muslim mayor in my community”6, “A Muslim
woman with a headscarf should not be allowed to be part
of a political TV-program”, “Exercising Muslim faith in
Germany should be restricted”. Response categories were
“completely agree” (1) “rather agree” (2) “rather
disagree” (3) and “completely disagree” (4). The four
items were rescaled so that higher values represent more
negative sentiments towards Muslims. The additive index
has a reliability of α  0.70.
To capture perceived non-recognition of either Muslims or
East Germans the questionnaire contains three items. The
sample is randomly split into two halves, with the following
questions referring either to Muslims (Split 1) or to East-
Germans (Split 2): “In Germany East Germans/Muslims are
treated like second-class citizens”, ‘East Germans/Muslims
have to make more efforts than the rest of the population
to achieve the same”, “East Germans/Muslims do not have
equal access to all social positions”. Respondents could
“completely disagree” (1) “rather disagree” (2) “rather
agree” (3) or “fully agree” (4). Reliability of the additive
index is α  0.74 when responses for both groups are pooled
(Muslim-related (Split 1) only: α  0.69; East-German-related
(Split 2) only: α  0.75.).
The same split is implemented to capture outgroup mobility
threat (OMT) by East Germans or Muslims. In our analyses, we
will only use the responses that refer to Muslims (Split 1). In the
respective split half, the following three items were used: “I would
have a bad feeling if more and more Muslims came into
important leadership positions on the labor market”, “We
must be careful that educational successes of Muslims are not
achieved at the expense of educational opportunities for the rest
of the population”, “I’m afraid that the better off Muslims are, the
more demands they make”. Here, response categories were “fully
agree” (1) “rather agree” (2) “rather disagree” (3) and
“completely disagree” (4) The four items were rescaled so
that higher values represent more threat. The reliability
coefficient is α  0.83.
Next to these variables of key interest, we control for several
independent variables in our analyses. Among them are basic
socio-economic characteristics, such as gender (female  1,
male  0), age (in years divided by 10) and migration
background (1  father or mother foreign-born, 0  father
and mother born in Germany).7 Education is measured in
terms of the highest school degree and classified into the three
categories low (no degree, Hauptschule), medium (Realschule)
and high (Abitur or Fachabitur). Occupational status is
measured in terms of the International Socio-Economic
Index (ISEI) based on Ganzeboom et al. (1992). In the
multivariate analyses we divide the ISEI score by 100 to
bring the effect sizes into a more comfortable range for
interpretation. Subjective economic well-being is measured
by the question “If you think about your own economic and
financial situation, is it very good ( 4), rather good ( 3),
rather bad ( 2) or very bad ( 1)?”.
Another set of independent variables relates to attitudes and
beliefs regarding the key arguments in the literature (seeMajor
Frameworks and Canonical Explanations). Religiosity is
measured by the question “How religious would you
describe yourself? Very religious, fairly religious, moderately
4The response category “more as a German” was explicitly presented (read) as an
alternative, but “both” was also coded as a separate category if this was the
spontaneous answer. The question was asked to all respondents who were born in
the East or who have at least one East-born parent. Therefore, some respondents
with East-German self-identity are also in the first three categories, however the
numbers are only marginal (6, 18 and 25) so that a distinction would make no
sense here.
5We were initially somewhat hesitant to include this item, because it was argued
that it might measure something different, namely a tendency toward a liberal
emphasis on secularism (Helbling, 2014). It is worth noting, however, that in our
survey the item only correlates very weakly (r  0.11) with the agreement to the
statement “Religious symbols should be forbidden in schools” and not really (r 
−0.01) negatively with the statement “I approve of Christian politicians basing their
politics on their religious imprint”. On the other hand, factor analyses strongly
support that the headscarf in school item loads high on a common factor of anti-
Islam attitudes.
6This item and the fourth item on restrictions to exercising Muslim faith are part of
a scale that has also been used in the German ALLBUS (Breyer and Danner 2015).
7The inclusion of respondents with a migration background in the analyses could
raise some doubts, as there may be additional identification processes related to
their country or culture of origin that could complicate the reasoning. But unlike
first-generation migrants, who are excluded, the second generation can be assigned
to the East-West typology. To be on the safe side, we ran all analyses without the
second generation and found that the results are remarkably similar. Only the
effects of the East-born in theWest were somewhat weaker. This seems to be due to
a relatively high proportion of second-generation Eastern Europeans in this group.
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religious, not religious at all, or anti-religious?” Answers were
coded so that higher scores reflect a higher religiosity.
Authoritarianism was queried with the two items “We
need strong leaders so that we can live safely in society”
and “Proven behaviors should not be questioned”.
Respondents could “completely disagree” (1) “rather
disagree” (2) “rather agree” (3) or “fully agree” (4).
The correlation between the two items is r  0.33. Basic
democratic orientations were measured by asking how
important or unimportant people thought certain factors
were to democracy. Three items were used to form an
additive 4-point scale (α  0.54): “that every person has
the right to express his or her opinion freely”, “that
undisturbed practice of religion is guaranteed”, and “that
no one may be discriminated against or preferred because of
his or her origin”. Plurality anxiety was captured by the two
items “no more than two genders should be officially
recognized“ and “marriage for all threatens my
understanding of family” (1  “completely disagree”, 2 
“rather disagree”, 3  “rather agree”, 4  “fully agree”; inter-
item correlation: r  0.46). Finally, contact with Muslims was
measured by how often this occurs within the circle of
acquaintances and how often it occurs in the
neighborhood (1  “never”, 2  “rarely”, 3  “sometimes”,
4  “often”, 5  “very often”; inter-item correlation: r  0.47).
Table 1 summarizes the range, the mean values and the
underlying number of cases for all variables used in our
analysis. Because it is of central interest, the table also
reports the mean values for the subgroups of the east-west
typology.
RESULTS
Testing Existing Explanations for East-West
Differences in Attitudes Towards Muslims
We begin our empirical analyses by testing how well factors related to
existing explanations can already account for East-West differences in
anti-Muslim sentiment. We do this by running a series of nested OLS
regressions that add stepwise sets of independent variables. The
estimates for the coefficients and standard errors of the East-West
typology in differentmodels are shown inFigure 1. The fullmodels are
presented in Supplementary Table S1.
Model M2 accounts for demographic composition by
controlling for age, gender, and for migration background.
All three variables have a significant effect, the signs being in
Table 1 | Descriptives (weighted means or mean shares) of variables used
















AMS 1 4 6,615 2.02 1.95 2.12 2.05 2.25 2.53
PNR
Muslims 1 4 3,208 2.36 2.37 2.37 2.19 2.29 2.56
East-Germans 1 4 3,295 1.87 1.76 2.21 2.07 2.12 2.61
OMT (Muslims) 1 4 3,240 2.20 2.13 2.33 2.27 2.41 2.76
Demographics
Age/10 1.5 9.5 6,585 5.07 5.00 4.97 4.97 5.36 5.77
Female 0 1 6,625 0.513 0.515 0.577 0.521 0.443 0.572
Migration
background
0 1 6,549 0.144 0.156 0.155 0.125 0.091 0.104
Socio-economics
Education: low 0 1 6,569 0.331 0.358 0.355 0.268 0.222 0.208
Medium 0 1 6,569 0.324 0.281 0.208 0.476 0.452 0.570
High 0 1 6,569 0.345 0.361 0.438 0.256 0.327 0.222
ISEI/100 0.116 0.890 5,449 0.478 0.485 0.469 0.451 0.478 0.448
ISEI missing 0 1 6,625 0.227 0.243 0.295 0.205 0.148 0.148
Subj. economic
well-being
1 4 6,574 2.98 3.00 2.94 3.04 2.95 2.78
Attitudes and beliefs
Religiosity 1 6 6,585 3.62 3.65 3.21 2.98 2.78 2.63
Authoritarianism 1 4 6,613 2.91 2.86 2.89 2.96 2.06 3.23
Basic democratic
orientations
1 4 6,618 3.62 3.66 3.53 3.58 3.53 3.38
Plurality anxiety 1 4 6,595 1.85 1.82 1.93 1.86 1.89 2.08
Context
Contacts Muslims 1 5 3,238 2.50 2.65 2.10 2.67 1.87 1.70
N (unweighted) 6,625 3,739 440 374 1,308 741
All means weighted; number of cases unweighted
Frontiers in Sociology | www.frontiersin.org November 2021 | Volume 6 | Article 7354216
Kalter and Foroutan East-West Differences in Anti-Muslim Sentiment in Germany
line with theory or previous research (seeMajor Frameworks and
Canonical Explanations). Negative attitudes toward Muslims
increase with age8 (0.12) and are lower among women (−0.05)
and respondents with an immigrant background (−0.13).
Comparing the effects for the East-West categories with Model
M1, we find that accounting for demographic composition does
not significantly change the estimates for East-born in the West
and West-born in the East. However, the demographic variables
do contribute to explaining the situation of the two subgroups of
East-born in the East by reducing the coefficients compared to
model M1 and significantly increasing the model fit with respect
to the R2.
The next model (M3) adds socioeconomic variables to the
model. It includes education, ISEI value of current or last job,
and subjective economic well-being.9 All three variables contribute
significantly and in the expected direction to the explanation.
Compared to respondents with low education, respondents with
medium education have slightly lower (−0.09) AMS, and
respondents with high education much lower (−0.39). AMS is
also reduced as ISEI scores increase (one hundred points of ISEI
score would change it by −0.35) and by subjective economic well-
being (−0.08). However, although these socioeconomic variables
contribute to the overall model fit, it is worth noting that
controlling for them does not really help explain the East-West
differences. On the contrary, the coefficient for East-born in the
West increases (0.24) and it is interesting to see that it is now more
or less at the same level as for East-born in the East without ESI
(0.26). This means that the gross difference between these groups
observed in model M1 can be explained by the demographic (M2)
and socioeconomic (M3) selectivity of those who have migrated to
theWest, and this underscores the importance of considering place
of birth rather than place of residence only. Similarly, West-born
respondents in the East are no longer significantly (0.06) different
from the reference group when demographic and socioeconomic
differences are taken into account.
In the next step (model M4), we control for four key personality
traits that have been surveyed in the theoretical and empirical
literature (see Major Frameworks and Canoci cal Explanations).
Religiosity has no significant effect (0.01) when controlling for the
other covariates. Authoritarianism (0.18), democratic values
FIGURE 2 | Comparison of perceived non-recognition (PNR) related to Muslims and East-Germans between East-West types.
FIGURE 1 | Effects of different East-West types on anti-Muslim
sentiment in several OLS regressions.
8The inclusion of a quadratic term did not improve the model fit significantly.
9Adding income categories did not improve the model fit beyond these three
variables significantly.
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(−0.56) and plurality anxiety (0.17) turn out to be relatively
strongly correlated with the dependent variable. This is reflected
in a high increase in the overall fit of the model (R2  0.37) and in
the fact that the effects of East-West typology are significantly
reduced compared to model M3.
Model M5 extends model M4 to include contact with
Muslims. Note that the questions underlying this index were
asked for only half of the sample (Split 1). Therefore, model
M4a reports the results from a model with the same
specifications as model M4, but estimated only for
respondents in Split 1. In model M5, contact with Muslims
has a weak effect in the expected direction (−0.06) and slightly
improves the overall fit compared to model M4a. It also has a
partial mediating effect on many of the other coefficients. Most
notably, controlling for contact also explains a substantial
portion of the east-west type differences, as shown by the
reduction in effects (except for east-born westerners)
compared to M4a. In particular we find that the coefficients
for three subtypes of East-West categories are close to zero and
no longer significantly different from zero.
This means that the factors related to the arguments available in
the literature can, by and large, explain the differences between four
of the five distinguished groups. This should not be over-
interpreted in a strict causal sense, as some of the variables that
contribute strongly to the models, notably authoritarianism and
democratic values, may suffer from endogeneity. But at least this
suggests that the reasons are closely related to these personality
traits. In contrast, and all the more surprisingly, the high level of
anti-Muslim sentiments of those East-born respondents in the East
who explicitly identify as East German cannot be fully explained, as
expected. Thus, hypothesis 1 is confirmed by our analyses.
Investigating the Peculiarities of Explicit
Self-Identification
This section examines the extent to which perceived non-
recognition and outgroup mobility threat contribute to
explaining anti-Muslim sentiments, particularly among East-
born respondents with explicit self-identification, and whether
there is evidence to support hypotheses 2, 3a, and 3b.
The Role of Perceived Non-Recognition
As described in the Data and Methods section, a special feature of
the East-Mig Survey is that a number of items were measured via
an experimental random split, i.e., for half of the respondents in
relation to Muslims and for the other half of the respondents in
relation to East Germans. Among these items are those measuring
perceived non-recognition (PNR). Figure 2 compares the mean
value of the scale across the different East-West types (see also
Table 1).
Among respondents living in the West, there is some
perception of non-recognition with respect to Muslims; the
mean score of the scale is 2.37 for both West-born and East-
born respondents. The mean scores for West-born and East-born
non-ESI respondents living in the East are only slightly lower
(2.19 and 2.29, respectively). Somewhat surprisingly, East-born
respondents with ESI tend to be even more sympathetic to the
disadvantages faced by Muslims (2.56).
The picture with respect to the perception of non-
recognition related to East Germans also reveals some
interesting patterns: Three of the groups – East-born in the
West, West-born in the East, East-born in the East non-ESI –
have values slightly above 2. In contrast, West-born
respondents in the West show particularly little
understanding of East Germans’ difficulties, with a mean
scale score of 1.76. At the other extreme, East-born
respondents in the East with ESI perceive a much stronger
non-recognition of East Germans (2.61). This is the only group
for which the score is even higher than for the respective non-
recognition with respect to Muslims. Thus, while there is a
remarkable and remarkably similar understanding of Muslim
disadvantage among the subgroups, there is quite a
discrepancy in the assessment of whether East Germans also
face similar processes of non-recognition.
FIGURE 3 | Predicted anti-Muslim sentiments (AMS) for different East-
West types dependent on perceived non-recognition (PNR) with respect to
East-Germans.
FIGURE 4 | Predicted anti-Muslim sentiments for different East-West-
types dependent on outgroup mobility threat (OMT) by Muslims.
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To investigate the role of perceived non-recognition and test
hypothesis 2, we include PNR values pertaining to East Germans
in the previous regressions. Note that due to the experimental
split we can do so only for half of the sample (Split 2) and we have
to omit the contact to Muslims as it is asked only in the other half.
This means we actually build up on the variables used in model
M4. In model M6 (see Supplementary Table S2) we just include
PNR as amain effect. We find that the variable weakly contributes
to the model (-0.03; p < 0.5) and that it somewhat reduces the
coefficient of East-born in East with ESI (0.21) as compared to
model M4, and also the difference to the coefficient for those
East-born in the East without ESI (0.17). However, we report this
just for the sake of completeness and this has to be interpreted
with caution: the variable PNR (related to East Germans) is an
outgroup measure among West Germans, but an ingroup
measure among East Germans and the described social
identity mechanism leading to AMS is likely to be triggered
only if there is an explicit self-identification with the ingroup.
In model M7 (see also Supplementary Table S2) we therefore
included PNR also as an interaction with the East-West typology.
Figure 3 shows the predicted anti-Muslim sentiments as a
function of PNR for each of the five East-West types. The values
of all other control variables in model M7 are assumed to be at the
means. Not surprisingly, perceived non-recognition has almost
no influence on the dependent variable AMS for West-born
respondents in the West. Neither does it affect AMS of East-
born respondents in the West, West-born respondents in the
East, or East-born respondents in the East without ESI. However,
the effect is highly pronounced, as expected, for East-born
respondents in the East with ESI.
The standard errors of the interaction effects in model M7 of
Supplementary Table S2 show that the difference in effect size
between East-born in the East with ESI and without ESI is also
statistically significant at least at a 5%-level. Thus, the analysis
confirms hypothesis 2.
The Role of Outgroup Mobility Threat
In the next step of our analyses, we examine the role of OMT and
explore hypotheses 3a and 3b. As can be seen inTable 1, the overall
scale mean of OMT toward Muslims is 2.20, which is lowest for
West-born respondents in the West (2.13) and highest for East-
born respondents with ESI in the East (2.76). As Model M8 in
Supplementary Table S2 shows, OMT strongly contributes to
explaining anti-Muslim sentiments, which is not surprising given
the general importance of threat concepts discussed in the
theoretical section. The expectation formulated in hypothesis 3a
is confirmed by the results of Model M8.
Model M8 also shows that OMT further reduces the relative
effect of East-born in the East with ESI (0.11) as compared to
model M5 (0.18). However, although OMT is strongly correlated
to AMS, the coefficient is still significantly different from zero on
a 5%-level, so OMT cannot fully explain the puzzle.
As hypothesis 3b above states, not only do we expect OMT to
be higher for East-born with ESI, but we also expect OMT to have
a stronger effect on AMS in this group. This is confirmed by the
results of modelM9 in Supplementary Table S2, in which we also
introduced interaction effects of OMT with the East-West
typology. They show that OMT is highest in the group of
East-born respondents with ESI. Figure 4 shows the
predictions resulting from the estimated main and interaction
effects when all other variables are set to their mean values.
We find that the effect of OMT on anti-Muslim sentiments is
indeed stronger for East-born in the East with ESI than for the
other groups. However, the difference in effect size is not
significant when compared to East-born in the East without
ESI, but it is significant at least at a 5% level when compared
to the other three groups. Thus, hypothesis 3b can be partially,
but not fully, confirmed.
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have been able to show that existing
explanations based on general theoretical frameworks and on
available empirical evidence on East German specificities explain
a large part of the empirical East-West differences in anti-Muslim
sentiment (AMS). The East-Mig survey data (Foroutan et al.,
2020) provide a rich repertoire of factors that have been used in
previous research and can be controlled for simultaneously. The
data also allow us to define the concept of “being East German” in
different ways. Upon closer examination, we find that the high
AMS scores of the subgroup of East-born respondents living in
the East who have an explicit self-identification (ESI) as East
Germans cannot yet be adequately explained.
To understand this better, we started with the fact that East
Germans to some extent have similar experiences and face similar
stereotypes as Muslims. We drew on social identity theory (Tajfel
and Turner, 1979) and theories of recognition (Taylor, 1992;
Honneth, 1996; Lamont, 2018) and discussed whether perceived
non-recognition (PNR) on the part of East Germans and some
sort of competition with Muslims for recognition could help
explain the relatively greater anti-Muslim attitudes (AMS). The
survey design provides an interesting insight into perceptions of
non-recognition (PNR), as the underlying items were
experimentally manipulated to measure analogous perceptions
with respect to either East Germans orMuslims. It turned out that
respondents in both East and West are quite aware of the
disadvantages faced by Muslims in general, but that West-
born respondents living in the West of Germany do not
perceive these disadvantages when it comes to East Germans,
whereas East-born respondents and West-born respondents
living in the East do so much more strongly. East-born
respondents in the East with ESI perceive themselves to be
disadvantaged to a slightly higher degree than the Muslim
population.
We were able to show that this sense of non-recognition is
indeed related to higher levels of anti-Muslim attitudes among
East-born respondents in the East with ESI. Among the other
groups of respondents, however, not only is there less perceived
non-recognition (PNR), but PNR (related to East Germans) does
not contribute very much to explain AMS. This interaction is
consistent with the expectations derived from social identity
theory. It supports our main argument that some East
Germans, especially those who identify strongly with the East,
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may see themselves as a minority or disadvantaged group
competing with Muslims for recognition by the dominant
group of West Germans. As a result, comparison with this
outgroup serves as a strategy to achieve self-esteem associated
with group membership.
We also argued that the potential social mobility of the
targeted outgroup should be particularly undesirable.
Accordingly, we identified outgroup mobility threat (OMT) as
another important concept in this process. OMT is a strong
predictor of AMS for all respondents, but it is extremely
pronounced among respondents born in the East, especially
those who explicitly identify as East Germans. Here, OMT is
also more strongly associated with AMS. This is further evidence
that the sense of competition, in this case the threat of perceived
mobility, plays a notable role in understanding the especially
strong negative attitudes in this group. However, the differences
with the other groups are more nuanced and not as clear as in the
PNR case. Although OMT contributes to explaining the
difference, it alone cannot tell the whole story for those who
self-identify as East Germans. As the results for PNR have
suggested, it appears to be the competition for recognition that
makes this group truly unique.
While all of this represents an unprecedented empirical
contribution to research on anti-Muslim sentiment and to the
understanding of right-wing populism, particularly in East
Germany, the study must be viewed as only a first step in
testing the hypothesized mechanisms, as it is fraught with
limitations: There is, of course, the problem of endogeneity; in
the absence of longitudinal data or useful instrumental variables
for anti-Muslim sentiment and perceived non-recognition, there
is the question of causality between the central concepts of ESI,
PNR, and AMS. Indeed, hostility toward the outgroup can also be
seen as a driver of ingroup identity processes and feelings of non-
recognition. Causalities between PNR and ESI can also point in
both directions. Disentangling these causalities more precisely is a
task and challenge for future research.
Furthermore, according to social identity theory, as briefly
mentioned above, there are additional coping strategies, including
comparing on a “new dimension” (Tajfel and Turner, 1979: 43). This
means questioning the superiority of the dominant outgroup by
emphasizing criteria that seemmore advantageous to the ingroup. In
public discourse, for example, it can be observed that some of the
current Eastern European regimes, even if they themselves hold anti-
democratic positions, have very much adapted the narrative that
they are the better or “real” democracies. They support this notion
primarily through the narrative that they would protect the rest of
Europe from migrant invasion and resist the Islamization of the
West, thus guaranteeing European freedom (Brown, 2018). By
accusing Western multicultural societies of being traitors to the
people and accusing their political elite of planning a “Grande
Remplacement” (Camus, 2011), they seem to positively delineate
their ingroup. This pattern of argumentation has been adopted by
the AfD and Pegida, explicitly even in the group names.10 It is thus a
useful strategy to explicitly attack the dominant outgroup by
questioning the value integrity of its members and claiming value
superiority. However, it is not so straight-forward to conclude how
this influences anti-Muslim sentiments in addition to the other
mechanisms. On the one hand, it could be argued that the further
belittling of the alternative marginal group, Muslims, serves
to compete with the challenged dominant group by
underscoring that the latter does not care enough about
the most important values. On the other hand, challenging
the values of the dominant group, thus “setting new
dimensions”, provides an alternative to the other coping
mechanisms, so one could also argue that the fact that the
dominant group is targeted makes the devaluation of the
other marginalized group less necessary. Exploring this and
other complexities arising from alternative coping strategies
is beyond the scope of this paper, but is certainly worthy of
closer consideration in subsequent research.
We would like to reiterate that the arguments andmechanisms
related to perceptions of nonrecognition among Eastern-born
respondents that we have focused on in this paper are only one
particular, complementary aspect of understanding differences in
anti-Muslim attitudes. It is, as our analyses as a whole have clearly
shown, only one factor among several others. Thus, the results
should by no means be understood as downplaying the strong
manifestations of right-wing populism in East Germany, which,
as the analyses in the section Testing Existing Explanations have
again shown, are also strongly associated with authoritarian,
antipluralist, and antidemocratic attitudes. Rather, our findings
on non-recognition should be understood as another piece that
adds to the puzzle.
Although we have focused on anti-Muslim attitudes (AMS) as
an outcome in this paper and treated them in terms of East-West
differences in Germany, we believe that our arguments and
results can explain much more than just this specific attitude
in this specific context. AMS can be seen as a “seismograph” for
measuring attitudes toward diversity, plurality, and fundamental
rights in general. One could even argue that anti-Muslim
sentiment can be considered a proxy for generalizable attitudes
toward democracy in contemporary immigration countries. Since
Muslims represent the largest cultural or religious minority in
contemporary Germany, it is reasonable to expect that measures
of AMS also provide an indication of the actual level of deeper
democratic beliefs in Germany or other comparable countries.
One could claim that “Muslim” here stands as a cipher for
migration-related pluralization, and that by rejecting Muslims,
other marginalized groups are also collaterally addressed. Anti-
feminism, homophobia and transphobia, anti-Semitism and
racism go hand-in-hand with the rise of anti-refugee, anti-
immigrant and anti-Muslim attitudes. The feeling that certain
social subgroups have of being a kind of minority “in their own
country” and the complaints about adequate recognition are not
unique to East Germans either: it is well documented that the
advancement of formally marginalized groups - whether women,
LGBTQ* or working-class people - can lead to status anxiety due
to a possible loss of privileges in other settings (Jackson, 2006;
Weis, 2006). Thus, the mechanisms highlighted in this paper
could also contribute to understanding similar feelings toward
10Pegida stands for “Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des
Abendlandes” (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident).
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other groups in other contexts by underscoring that behind them
may not only be structural disadvantages and realistic threats, but
also recognition gaps and a race for second place.
DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Publicly available datasets were analyzed in this study. This data can
be found here: https://doi.org/10.34882/dezim.postmig1.c.1.1.0.
ETHICS STATEMENT
Ethical review and approval was not required for the study on
human participants in accordance with the local legislation and
institutional requirements. Written informed consent from the
participants’ legal guardian/next of kin was not required to
participate in this study in accordance with the national
legislation and the institutional requirements.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
All authors listed have made a substantial, direct, and
intellectual contribution to the work and approved it for
publication.
FUNDING
The publication of this article was funded by the Baden-
Württemberg Ministry of Science, Research and the Arts and
by the University of Mannheim.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL




Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J., and Sanford, R. N. (1950).
The Authoritarian Personality. New York: Harper and Brothers.
Alba, R., and Johnson, M. (2000). “Zur Messung Aktueller Einstellungsmuster
Gegenüber Ausländern in Deutschland,” in Deutsche und Ausländer: Freunde,
Fremde oder Feinde. Editor R. Alba (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag), 229–253.
doi:10.1007/978-3-322-86615-8_8
Allport, G. W. (1954). The Nature of Prejudice. Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Asbrock, F., Sibley, C. G., and Duckitt, J. (2010). Right-Wing Authoritarianism and
Social Dominance Orientation and the Dimensions of Generalized Prejudice: A
Longitudinal Test. Eur. J. Pers. 24 (4), 324–340. doi:10.1002/per.746
Blalock, H. M. (1967). Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations. New York:
Wiley.
Blumer, H. (1958). Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position. Pac. Sociological
Rev. 1, 3–7. doi:10.2307/1388607
Breyer, B., and Danner, D. (2015). Einstellung zum Islam (ALLBUS).
Zusammenstellung sozialwissenschaftlicher Items und Skalen (ZIS).
doi:10.6102/zis231
Brown, W. (2018). Neoliberalism’s Frankenstein: Authoritarian Freedom in
Twenty-First Century "Democracies". Crit. Times. 1 (1), 60–79. doi:10.1215/
26410478-1.1.60
Campbell, D. T. (1967). Stereotypes and the Perception of Group Differences. Am.
Psychol. 22, 817–829. doi:10.1037/h0025079
Camus, R. (2011). Le Grand Remplacement Plieux: Chez L’auteur.
De Guissmé, L., and Licata, L. (2017). Competition Over Collective Victimhood
Recognition: When Perceived Lack of Recognition for Past Victimization Is
Associated With Negative Attitudes Towards Another Victimized Group. Eur.
J. Soc. Psychol. 47, 148–166. doi:10.1002/ejsp.2244
Der Bundeswahleiter (2021). Ergebnisse Früherer Landtagswahlen. Wiesbaden:
Informationen des Bundeswahlleiters.
Foroutan, N., and Hensel, J. (2020). Die Gesellschaft der Anderen. Berlin: Aufbau.
Foroutan, N., Kalter, F., Canan, C., and Simon, M. (2019). Ost-Migrantische
Analogien I. Konkurrenz um Anerkennung. Berlin: DeZIM-Institut.
Foroutan, N., Kalter, F., Canan, C., and Simon, M. (2020). Postmigrantische
Gesellschaften: Ost-Migrantische Analogien. Dataset: Version: 1.0.0.
Deutsches Zentrum für Integrations- und Migrationsforschung (DeZIM).
doi:10.34882/dezim.postmig1.c.1.1.0
Gabler, S., and Häder, S. (2009). “Die Kombination von Mobilfunk- und
Festnetzstichproben in Deutschland,” in Umfrageforschung:
Herausforderungen und Grenzen. Editor M. Weichbold (Wiesbaden: VS
Verlag), 239–252. doi:10.1007/978-3-531-91852-5_12
Ganzeboom, H. B. G., De Graaf, P. M., De Graaf, P. M., and Treiman, D. J. (1992).
A Standard International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status. Soc.
Sci. Res. 21 (1), 1–56. doi:10.1016/0049-089x(92)90017-b
Golec de Zavala, A., Guerra, R., and Simão, C. (2017). The Relationship Between
the Brexit Vote and Individual Predictors of Prejudice: Collective Narcissism,
RightWing Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation. Front. Psychol. 8,
2023. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.02023
Helbling, M. (2014). Opposing Muslims and the Muslim Headscarf in Western
Europe. Eur. Sociological Rev. 30 (2), 242–257. doi:10.1093/esr/jct038
Hewstone, M., and Swart, H. (2011). Fifty-odd Years of Inter-Group Contact: From
Hypothesis to Integrated Theory. Br. J. Soc. Psychol. 50 (3), 374–386.
doi:10.1111/j.2044-8309.2011.02047.x
Honneth, A. (1996). The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social
Conflicts. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Hunt, J. (2006). Staunching Emigration From East Germany: Age and the
Determinants of Migration. J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 4 (5), 1014–1037.
doi:10.1162/jeea.2006.4.5.1014
Jackson, S. (2006). Interchanges: Gender, Sexuality and Heterosexuality. Feminist
Theor. 7 (1), 105–121. doi:10.1177/1464700106061462
Kalmar, I. (2020). The East Is Just Like the West, Only More So: Islamophobia and
Populism in Eastern Germany and the East of the European Union. J. Contemp.
Eur. Stud. 28 (1), 15–29. doi:10.1080/14782804.2019.1673704
Kalter, F., Jonsson, J., van Tubergen, F., and Heath, A. (2018). Growing up in
Diverse Europe. The Integration of the Children of Immigrants in England.
Germany, Netherlands and Sweden: Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Köpping, P. (2018). Integriert doch erst mal uns!: Eine Streitschrift für den Osten.
Berlin: Links Verlag.
Krause, P. (2019). 30 Jahre seit dem Mauerfall: Forschritte und Defizite bei der
Angleichung der Lebensverhältnisse in Ost- und Westdeutschland. DIW
Wochenbericht. 45, 827–838.
Kröhnert, S., and Vollmer, S. (2012). Gender-Specific Migration From Eastern to
Western Germany: Where Have All the Young Women Gone? Int. Migration.
50 (5), 95–112. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2435.2012.00750.x
Kubiak, D. (2019). “East German Identity: A Never-Ending Story?” in The Third
Wave in Science and Technology Studies. Editor D. Caudill (Palgrave
Macmillan), 151–173. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-14335-0_9
Küpper, B., Schröter, F., and Zick, A. (2019). “Alles nur ein Problem der
Ostdeutschen oder Einheit in Wut und Hass? Rechtsextreme und
menschenfeindliche Einstellungen in Ost- und Westdeutschland,” in
Verlorene Mitte – Feindselige Zustände. Editor A. Zick (Bonn: Dietz),
243–282.
Lamont, M. (2018). Addressing Recognition Gaps: Destigmatization and the Reduction
of Inequality. Am. Sociol. Rev. 83 (3), 419–444. doi:10.1177/0003122418773775
Frontiers in Sociology | www.frontiersin.org November 2021 | Volume 6 | Article 73542111
Kalter and Foroutan East-West Differences in Anti-Muslim Sentiment in Germany
Lengfeld, H., and Dilger, C. (2018). Kulturelle und ökonomische Bedrohung. Eine
Analyse der Ursachen der Parteiidentifikation mit der “Alternative für
Deutschland" mit dem Sozio-oekonomischen Panel 2016. Z. für Soziologie.
47 (3), 181–199. doi:10.1515/zfsoz-2018-1012
Lewicki, A. (2018). Race, Islamophobia and the Politics of Citizenship in Post-
Unification Germany. Patterns of Prejudice. 52 (5), 496–512. doi:10.1080/
0031322x.2018.1502236
Mudde, C. (2013). Three Decades of Populist Radical Right Parties in Western
Europe: So What? Eur. J. Polit. Res. 52 (1), 1–19. doi:10.1111/j.1475-
6765.2012.02065.x
Pettigrew, T. F., and Tropp, L. R. (2006). A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup
Contact Theory. J. Pers Soc. Psychol. 90 (5), 751–783. doi:10.1037/0022-
3514.90.5.751
Pfündel, K., Stichs, A., and Tanis, K. (2021). Muslimisches Leben in Deutschland
2020. Forschungsbericht 38 Nürnberg: Bundesamt für Migration und
Flüchtlinge.
Pickel, G., and Öztürk, C. (2018). Islamophobia Without Muslims? The "Contact
Hypothesis" as an Explanation for Anti-Muslim Attitudes - Eastern European
Societies in a Comparative Perspective. J. Nationalism, Mem. Lang. Polit. 12 (2),
162–191. doi:10.2478/jnmlp-2018-0009
Pickel, G., and Yendell, A. (2018). “Religion als konfliktärer Faktor im
Zusammenhang mit Rechtsextremismus, Muslimfeindschaft und AfD-
Wahl,” in Flucht Ins Autoritäre. Editors O. Decker, and E. Brähler (Gießen:
Psychosozial Verlag), 217–242.
Pollack, D. (2004). Support for Democracy in Eastern and Western Germany: an
Attempt to Explain the Differences. Arch. Eur. Sociol. 45, 257–272. doi:10.1017/
s0003975604001456
Rees, J. H., and Lamberty, P. (2019). “Mitreißende Wahrheiten:
Verschwörungsmythen als Gefahr für den gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhalt,”
in Verlorene Mitte – Feindselige Zustände. Editor A. Zick (Bonn: Dietz), 203–222.
Rippl, S., and Seipel, C. (2018). Modernisierungsverlierer, Cultural Backlash,
Postdemokratie. Köln Z. Soziol. 70 (2), 237–254. doi:10.1007/s11577-018-0522-1
Rydgren, J. (2008). Immigration Sceptics, Xenophobes or Racists? Radical Right-
Wing Voting in SixWest European Countries. Eur. J. Polit. Res. 47 (6), 737–765.
doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2008.00784.x
Savelkoul, M., Scheepers, P., Tolsma, J., and Hagendoorn, L. (2011). Anti-Muslim
Attitudes in the Netherlands: Tests of Contradictory Hypotheses Derived from
Ethnic Competition Theory and Intergroup Contact Theory. Eur. sociological
Rev. 27 (6), 741–758. doi:10.1093/esr/jcq035
Schmidt, P., Weick, S., and Gloris, D. (2019). Wann wirken Kontakte zwischen
Migranten und Mehrheitsgesellschaft? Längsschnittanalysen zu Erfahrungen
mit Kontakten und zur Bewertung von Flüchtlingen und Muslimen durch die
deutsche Bevölkerung. Informationsdienst Soziale Indikatoren. (61), 24–29.
doi:10.15464/isi.61.2019.24-29
Schrenker, M., Lietz, A., and Elis, J. (2020). Postmigrantische Gesellschaften: Ost-
Migrantische Analogien. Daten- und Methodenbericht (Version 1.0.0). Berlin:
DeZIM Institut.
Sherif, M., and Sherif, C. W. (1969). Social Psychology. New York: Harper & Row.
Spivak, G. C., and Harasym, S. (2014). The Post-Colonial Critic: Interviews,
Strategies, Dialogues. New York and London: Routledge
Stephan, W. G., and Stephan, C. W. (1996). Predicting Prejudice. Int. J. Intercultural
Relations. 20 (3-4), 409–426. doi:10.1016/0147-1767(96)00026-0
Stephan, W. G., and Stephan, C. W. (2000). “An Integrated Threat Theory of
Prejudice,” in Reducing Prejudice and Discrimination. Editors S. Oskamp
(Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum), 33–56.
Strabac, Z., and Listhaug, O. (2008). Anti-Muslim Prejudice in Europe: A
Multilevel Analysis of Survey Data from 30 Countries. Soc. Sci. Res. 37 (1),
268–286. doi:10.1016/j.ssresearch.2007.02.004
Tajfel, H., and Turner, J. C. (1979). “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict,”
in The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. Editors W. G. Austin, and
S. Worchel (Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole), 33–48.
Taylor, C. (1992). Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Vogel, L., and Zajak, S. (2020). Teilhabe ohne Teilnahme? Wie Ostdeutsche und
Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund in der bundesdeutschen Elite vertreten
sind. Berlin: DeZIM-Research Notes 4/20.
Weis, L. (2006). Masculinity, Whiteness, and the New Economy. Men and
Masculinities. 8 (3), 262–272. doi:10.1177/1097184x05282069
Weisskircher, M. (2020). The Strength of Far-Right AfD in Eastern Germany: The
East-West Divide and the Multiple Causes behind ’Populism’. Polit. Q. 91 (3),
614–622. doi:10.1111/1467-923x.12859
Zick, A., Berghan, W., and Mokros, N. (2019). “Gruppenbezogene
Menschenfeindlichkeit in Deutschland 2002-2018/19,” in Verlorene Mitte –
Feindselige Zustände. Editor A. Zick (Bonn: Dietz), 53–116.
Zick, A., and Küpper, B. (2016). “Rechtsextreme und menschenfeindliche
Einstellungen,” in Handbuch Rechtsextremismus (Wiesbaden: Springer VS),
83–113. doi:10.1007/978-3-531-19085-3_4
Conflict of Interest: The authors declare that the research was conducted in the
absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a
potential conflict of interest.
Publisher’s Note: All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors
and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of
the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in
this article, or claim that may be made by its manufacturer, is not guaranteed or
endorsed by the publisher.
Copyright © 2021 Kalter and Foroutan. This is an open-access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use,
distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original
author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication
in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use,
distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Sociology | www.frontiersin.org November 2021 | Volume 6 | Article 73542112
Kalter and Foroutan East-West Differences in Anti-Muslim Sentiment in Germany
